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I. INTRODUCTION
During the past few years, virtually all state and federal jurisdictions have
considered various alternative dispute resolution methods to treat major
problems with their court systems.1 Concern over the delay and high costs in
the courts has led to the development of many procedural rule changes' and
* Research for this article was partially funded by The Program on Conflict Resolution, The
University of Hawaii at Manoa. The data utilized was collected as part of an evaluation of
Hawaii's Court-Annexed Arbitration Program which was funded by The Judiciary of the State of
Hawaii. The authors would like to thank the following people for their assistance on this project:
the project staff of the Study of Arbitration and Litigation, Claudia Kamiyama, Mark Barnard,
Thomas Webb, and Ratana Ariyavisitakul; our colleague and co-researcher, Professor David
Chandler; Peter Adler, Director of the Hawaii Judiciary's Program on Alternative Dispute
Resolution; Arbitration Administrator Ed Aoki and Susan Izumi; and Arbitration Judge Ronald
T.Y. Moon.
** Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii, B.B.A.
1967, M.B.A. 1968, J.D. 1971, University of Michigan.
*** Professor of Sociology, Department of Sociology, University of Hawaii, A.B. 1951, Mis-
souri; M.A. 1956, Ph.D. 1958, Harvard.
See generally THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC RESOURCES LEGAL PROGRAM, ADR AND THE COURTS
(1987) (hereinafter ADR]. In 1985, under the direction of Hawaii's Chief Justice Herman T.F.
Lum, the Hawaii Judiciary, with partial support monies from the National Institute for Dispute
Resolution, established a Program on Alternative Dispute Resolution. Peter S. Adler, formerly
executive director of the Neighborhood Justice Center of Honolulu, was appointed as the Pro-
gram's director. The Program has three general objectives: (1) to gather and disseminate up-to-
date information on alternative dispute resolution methods; (2) to explore, rest and evaluate new
uses for mediation and arbitration; and (3) to help institutionalize these uses both in the courts
and in the community-at-large. THE JUDICIARY. STATE OF HAWAII, 1984-1985 ANNUAL REPORT
(1985).
" In 1983 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended to explicitly allow the judge to
facilitate settlement discussions at the pretrial conference. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(A)(5). For an exam-
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innovative programs.'
Court-annexed arbitration is one of the most popular innovations.4 Although
the arbitration programs vary considerably in their form, they typically provide
for mandatory, yet non-binding arbitration on cases that seek only money dam-
ages.8 The right to jury trial is preserved because either party may appeal the
arbitration award to a trial de novo, but in some programs, sanctions may be
imposed if the trial verdict does not improve on the arbitration award.
Court-annexed arbitration programs generally have been designed to ease
court congestion and reduce delay." These programs, however, also offer the
possibility of cost savings in the private litigation costs of plaintiffs and defend-
ants, and in the public costs of operating the courts.
Whether court-annexed arbitration indeed does reduce delay and cost must
be the subject of careful evaluation. The potential for improvements appears
promising, but actual results will depend upon the arbitration procedures and
the behavior of lawyers. For example, arbitration could save time and increase
the pace of case processing either because the lawyers negotiate a settlement
prior to the arbitration or because the arbitration hearing occurs earlier in the
life of a case than a trial would occur. Time savings will not be realized, how-
ever, if parties do not reach an early settlement because they prefer to wait for
an arbitration award rather than negotiate an earlier settlement or if a significant
number of awards are appealed to a trial de novo after the arbitration hearing.
Because arbitration programs can reduce the amount of time that judges
must spend on pretrial hearings, and the trial itself, the courts may save a
considerable amount of judge and staff time, thereby reducing public costs.7
The impact on private litigation costs of the parties, however, is less dear. Pri-
pie of a state rule specifically concerning settlement conferences, see HAW. CIR. CT. R. 12.1.
" See Planet, Reducing Case Delay and the Costs of Civil Litigation: The Kentucky Economical
Litigation Project, 37 RUTGERS L REV. 279 (1985); Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial -An Alter-
native Method of Resolving Disputes, 69 JUDICATURE 286 (1986); Levine, Early Neutral Evalua-
tion: A Follow-Up Report, 70 JUDICATURE 236 (1987).
4 See P. EBENER & D. BETANCOURT, COURT-ANNExED ARBITRATION: THE NATIONAL PICTURE
(Rand Institute for Civil Justice 1985); NATIONAL CENTER OF STATE COURTS AND THE CONFER-
ENCE OF STATE COURT ADMINISTRATORS, 1987 SURVEY OF STATE COURT ADMINISTRATORS (July
17, 1987) (hereinafter NATIONAL CENTER].
5 Levin, Court-Annexed Arbitration, 16 J. LAW REFORM 537, 537 (1983).
E. ROLPH, INTRODUCING COURT-ANNExED ARBITRATION: A POUCYMAKER'S GUIDE 6 (Rand
Institute for Civil Justice 1984). This volume also presents an excellent overview of the considera-
tions involved in designing an arbitration program. See also Hensler, Court-Annexed Arbitration,
in ADR, supra note 1, at 34-37.
' For a discussion on calculating public cost savings, see E. ROI.H, supra note 6, at 33. For a
discussion about the public financing of private litigation, see Alschuler, Mediation with A Mug-
ger: The Shortage of Adjudicative Services and the Need for a Two-Tier System in Civil Cases, 99
HARV. L. REv. 1808, 1811-17 (1986).
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vate cost savings would appear to correlate with the length of time a case re-
mains open and to be inextricably linked to the amount of pretrial discovery.8
Recent research, however, indicates that case processing time is not correlated
with costs." Therefore, if arbitration does not also reduce discovery and the
amount of lawyer time, litigants are unlikely to save much in costs.1 0 In fact,
costs will increase for those cases that are appealed after the arbitration award,
since such cases will then incur the normal costs of litigation. However, the
increased costs for the few cases that actually go to trial might be more than
offset by the reduction in costs for cases that terminate in arbitration. Because
the discovery question is so difficult, most programs do not attempt to limit
discovery," but at most restrict the time for,"2 but not the activity of,
discovery.1 "
Since February 15, 1986, Hawaii has been experimenting with a court-an-
nexed arbitration program for some types of civil cases. Hawaii's Court-An-
nexed Arbitration Program (CAAP) is limited to tort cases, 4 but has several
unique features that should be of interest to people across the country who are
concerned with court management and alternative dispute resolution.
A. Reasons for National Interest in the Hawaii Program
The reasons for national interest in the Hawaii CAAP are found both in the
central characteristics of the program and in the priority of program goals. The
S See Hensler, supra note 6, at 39.
* Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L.
REv. 72, 104 (1983) [hereinafter Costs of Litigation].
'0 See id.
" Alschuler, supra note 7, at 1845.
Only three states, Pennsylvania, Arizona, and Hawaii, appear to have arbitration programs that
limit discovery. The Pennsylvania program is for small cases. In Pittsburgh, no discovery is al-
lowed in cases valued at less than $3,000. Developments, Compulsory Automobile Arbitration: New
Jersey's Road to Reducing Court Congestion, Delay, and Costs, 37 RUrGERs L. Rtv. 401, 415
(1985). See ARiz. UNIF. ARB. R. 3 ("The arbitrator ... shall limit discovery whenever appropri-
ate to insure that the purpose of compulsory arbitration is complied with.")
In the Hawaii program, discovery reduction is the key feature of the arbitration program.
"Once a case is submitted or ordered to the program, the extent to which discovery is allowed, if
at all, is at the sole discretion of the arbitrator." HAW. ARB. R. 14.
", Snow & Abramson, Alternative to Litigation: Court-Annexed Arbitration, 20 CAL. W.L. REv.
43, 58 (1983).
'3 Some states are beginning to restrict discovery in regular litigation. Planet, supra note 3, at
279.
" In Hawaii, tort cases account for approximately twenty-five percent of all Circuit Court
cases, which are courts of general jurisdiction. For fiscal year 1986-87, of 5987 civil filings,
1,785, or 29.8 percent were personal injury cases. THE JUDICIARY, STATE OF HAWAII, 1986-1987
ANNUAL REPORT, STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, table 7 (1987).
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program has the highest dollar ceiling ($150,000) of any mandatory state arbi-
tration program in the country and is the only state-wide program, it urges the
arbitrator to limit discovery as a way of reducing litigant costs, it intervenes
earlier in the case than other programs, and it uses volunteer arbitrators. Other
important features include a "gatekeeping" procedure that presumes all cases
are eligible for arbitration, a procedure that allows attorneys to seek exemption
from the program when they think their case exceeds the $150,000 ceiling, a
required pre-hearing conference thirty days after an arbitrator has been assigned,
and an option for litigants to select and pay for their own arbitrator.
The Hawaii CAAP differs from similar programs in other states because its
primary purpose is to decrease litigant costs by reducing discovery activity. The
program accomplishes this goal by prohibiting any discovery unless the arbitra-
tor first authorizes the discovery. Most other arbitration programs would list
their goals in the following order: (1) reduction of delay, (2) decrease in cost to
litigants and (3) maintenance or improvement of litigant satisfaction. The Ha-
waii CAAP, however, has significantly reordered these priorities. The CAAP has
made the decrease in costs to litigants the highest priority and therefore expects
arbitrators to limit discovery in order to achieve the cost reduction goal.
This article first reviews court-annexed arbitration programs across the coun-
try. It then discusses pretrial delay and the high cost of litigation, which are the
two most worrisome problems in the United States' judicial system. The arti-
de's discussion of delay and cost emphasizes how pretrial discovery and lawyers'
fees contribute to these problems. The article then describes the Hawaii CAAP
in detail with emphasis on the method used to limit pretrial discovery to reduce
litigant costs.
The article then presents and interprets data taken from court records and
lawyer surveys. Further evaluation shows that the Hawaii CAAP reduces litiga-
tion costs, that it may affect the incomes of lawyers, that it changes the level of
lawyer satisfaction, and that defense lawyers see fewer benefits in the program
than do plaintiff's lawyers.
II. COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION ACROSS THE NATION
Because of the rapid spread of arbitration programs nationally, it is difficult
to say exactly how many jurisdictions currently use court-annexed arbitration
programs. It is dear, however, that these programs have become very popular.
Programs are currently operating in at least twenty-two states,1 5 the District of
'5 CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADMINISTRATORS ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION SURVEY:
SURVEY OVERVIEW 6 (July 17, 1987); 1 Alternative Dispute Resolution Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at
313 (Nov. 26, 1987) [hereinafter SURVEY OvERvIEW).
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Columbia, and at least eleven United States Federal District Courts.' 6 In three
other states, arbitration programs are authorized but not yet operational."
It is also difficult to give precise national statistics about arbitration program
characteristics because the programs are often described as experimental and
frequently undergo significant changes."8 In addition, jurisdictional thresholds
may change' 9 or the programs may operate only in certain counties of the states
that have adopted court-annexed arbitration."0 Typically, the programs are lim-
ited to certain types of civil cases where the plaintiff seeks only money dam-
ages."' Personal injury, contract, and debt cases are the typical cases that are
arbitrated in these programs.2 2 Most of the programs are mandatory;23 any case
within the jurisdictional limit must go into arbitration. All programs, however,
are non-binding 4.2 Either party who is dissatisfied with the arbitration award
can appeal and go on to a trial de novo. Many programs apply costs or sanctions
to the appeal in an attempt to reduce the number of appeals.
16 As of January 1985 11 federal district courts had authorized court-annexed arbitration and
at least 17 federal districts had applied for funds to operate new programs to start in 1985. P.
EBENER & D. BETANCOURT, supra note 4, at 2, 6. The federal districts are the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, the Northern District of California, Connecticut, the Middle District of Florida, the
Western District of Michigan, the District of New Jersey, the Southern District of New York,
the Middle District of North Carolina, the Western District of Oklahoma, the Western District
of Texas, and the Western District of Missouri. Lind & Foster, Alternative Dispute Resolution in
the Federal Courts: Public and Private Options, 33 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 127 (1986).
" Alaska, Illinois, and New Mexico have authorized arbitration. NATIONAL CENTER, supra
note 4.
" For example, Hawaii's arbitration program was described as a two-year experiment when it
first began under the authorization of a state supreme court rule in February, 1986. Less than six
months later, the state legislature created a new three-year experimental program. Letter from
Janice Wolf, Administrative Director of the Courts, and Peter S. Adler, Director, Program on
ADR, to the President and Members of the Senate, and the Speaker and Members of the House
of Representatives of the Thirteenth State Legislature of the State of Hawaii (Dec. 30, 1986)
(available in the office of The Study of Arbitration and Litigation, University of Hawaii at
Manoa).
" The state legislature increased the jurisdictional ceiling of Hawaii's arbitration program from
$50,000 to $150,000 when the program was less than six months old. HAW. REV. STAT. § 601-
20 (Supp. 1986).
20 Usually the programs operate in major metropolitan districts. P. EBENER & D. BETANCOURT,
supra note 4, at 5-6. To our knowledge, Hawaii is the only state in which the arbitration pro-
gram operates in every county.
21 Id. at 9-10.
22 Id. at 7.
22 Hawaii's initial Phase I program was voluntary. Lawyers had to request that their cases be
placed into the arbitration program. HAW. ARB. R. 8 (repealed 1987).
24 P. EBENER & D. BETANCOURT, supra note 4, at 4.
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A. Case Size
Court-annexed arbitration programs in state courts are generally limited to
'smaller" cases, although federal courts usually have high jurisdictional limits,
usually $50,000 to $150,000. The maximum dollar limit for cases in the state
programs typically ranges from $15,000 to $50,000,5 although state programs
range from a $2000 ceiling to no limit at all. Hawaii has the second highest
jurisdictional limit for a mandatory program in the nation and has the highest
jurisdictional limit among those states that provide full arbitration hearings and
take testimony from witnesses. Although the Michigan Mediation Program,
which has no dollar limit, takes higher valued cases than CAAP, the Michigan
program is really a case evaluation program. 6 The Michigan program does not
hear testimony from witnesses, but hears only brief, summary presentations
from lawyers. Therefore, Hawaii has the only state program that conducts arbi-
tration hearings where parties can make personal presentations to a fact finder in
cases valued at over $50,000.
B. Compensation
Almost every jurisdiction compensates their arbitrators." Most are either
paid by the day2" or by the case. 9 The unit of compensation however may not
be a clear guide to the program's cost. In some programs arbitrators may work
on a case for many days; while in other programs, the arbitrator can hear several
cases in one day."0
C. Delay and Costs, Discovery and Fees
Despite the fact that Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure con-
dudes with, "[these rules of civil procedure] shall be construed to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action," 1 virtually no one
would seriously assert that the civil justice system in the United States is either
25 P. EBENER & D. BETANcouRT, supra note 4.
26 Shuart, Smith & Planet, Settling Cases in Detroit: An Examination of Wayne County's "Me-
diation" Program, 8 JUST. Sys. J. 307 (1983) [hereinafter Settling Cases in Detroit).
21 It appears that only Hawaii and New Hampshire do not compensate their arbitrators. P.
EBENER & D. BETANCOURT, supra note 4, at 9-10.
28 Daily compensation ranges from $50 to $250 per day. E.g., ARIZ. UNIF. ARB. R. 6.
29 Compensation by the case ranges from $35 to $250 per case. P. EBENER & D. BETANCOURT,
supra note 4, at 9-10. E.g., CUYAHOGA COUNTY CT. C.P.R. 29(V).
80 Some programs pay by the day or by the case, whatever is greater. CAL. CIV. P. CODE S
1141.18(b) (West Supp. 1985).
31 FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
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speedy or inexpensive." Delay and high costs,3 3 often resulting from congested
dockets and excessive discovery, are considered the major problems of the
American litigation system.3 4
The statistics about delay seem significant; the criticism" appears sound."
The number of lawsuits filed each year has increased dramatically," but the
number of judgeships has not risen at a rate in any way comparable to the
increase in filings.38 Although increased filings are attributable to population
growth, other factors are also responsible. For example, state and federal legisla-
tures have created new claims.3 9 Moreover, court case loads have increased con-
siderably faster than the population."' Furthermore, Americans may be becom-
31 For a critique of the problems with the civil justice system, see J. MARKS, E. JOHNSON & P.
SZANTON, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN AMERIcA 9-10, (National Institute for Dispute Resolution
1984); and Yamamoto, Case Management and the Hawaii Courts: The Evolving Role of the Mana-
gerial Judge in Civil Litigation, 9 U. HAW. L. REv. 395, 396 (1987).
" Delay and high costs are usually discussed together. "Excessive cost and delay in the dispo-
sition of civil cases devalue judgments, cause the memories of witnesses and parties to fade, cause
litigants to accept less than full value for their claims, prolong and exacerbate differences between
people or entities, and make pursuing legal remedies prohibitively expensive for many people."
ABA's LAWYERS CONFERENCE TASK FORCE ON REDUCTION OF LITIGATION COST AND DELAY, DE-
FEATING DELAY xiii (1986). See also ABA ACTION COMM'N TO REDUCE COURT COSTS AND DE-
LAY, ATTACKING LITIGATION COSTS AND DELAY: FINAL REPORT (1984). Planet, supra note 3 ("Of
the issues facing courts today, perhaps none is more urgent or visible than that of long delays and
high costs to litigants associated with the pace of civil litigation.").
34 The problems are not limited to the United States. See Falt, Congestion and Delay in Asia's
Courts, 4 UCLA PAC. BASIN UJ. 90 (1985).
35 J. ADLER, W. FELSTINER, D. HENSLER & M. PETERSON, THE PACE OF LITIGATION iii (Rand
Institute for Civil Justice 1982) [hereinafter PACE OF LITIGATION) ("Of all the criticisms of the
civil justice system, the charge of unjustifiable delay is probably the most frequently levelled and
the most deeply felt.").
. " Although there are some court statistics about court backlogs and many anecdotal stories,
there simply is not as much empirical evidence on delay. Id. at vi.
According to the former Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, "[t]he caseloads
in both federal and state courts experienced a fantastic growth during the past sixteen years"
Burger, Introduction, Symposium: Reducing The Costs of Civil Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 217,
217 (1985).
" Former United States Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren E. Burger said "In the federal
system alone, for example, the number of new filings in District Courts have nearly tripled from
112,606 when I took office in 1969 to 307,582 in 1985; the number of judges has increased
only about 50%. In short, 300% more cases are to be handled by 50% more judges." ABA
LAWYERS CONFERENCE TASK FORCE ON REDUCTION OF LITIGATION COST AND DELAY, DEFEATING
DELAY vii (1986).
39 S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION 4 (1985); Yamamoto, supra
note 32, at 400-01.
4 In California the number of civil cases increased by 75% between 1969 and 1979, D.
HENSLER, A. LIPSON & E. ROLPH, JUDICIAL ARBITRATION IN CALIFORNIA, 4-7 (Rand Institute for
Civil Justice 1981). Between 1977 and 1981, the number of civil lawsuits in state courts grew
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ing even more litigious.41 For whatever the reason, "you'll be hearing from my
lawyer" remains the battle cry."2
Despite the application of managerial judging techniques for the purpose of
controlling the growing case dockets,"3 the assigned trial date may be several
years after the date a case is filed in a major metropolitan area.4 4 Despite some
contrary evidence, 45 it is generally assumed that delay is harmful to litigants'
cases and results in higher costs of litigation.4 It is less clear however when,
why, and where delay occurs."7 Delay in the courts results, it is claimed, from
congested court dockets that do not allow for trial dates until sometimes years
after the filing of a complaint. Yet, a closer look shows that trial dates are not
the true problem. The real problem is simply that cases are not resolved quickly
enough because most cases never reach trial."8 In theory, trial dates should not
be significant. The trial date focus is important only because many cases do not
get resolved until shortly before trial. 9
four times faster than the population of the United States, TIME, Mar. 24, 1986, at 20. However,
while total filings have increased, not all types of litigation have increased at these dramatic rates.
For example, between 1978 and 1984 the number of new tort cases increased 9% in 17 states,
but the population in those states only rose 8%. The Manufactured Crisis, MED. ECONS., Nov. 10,
1986, at 69 (cited in D. HENSLER, M. VAIANA, J. KAKALIK & M. PETERSON, TRENDS IN TORT
LITIGATION 2 (Rand Institute for Civil Justice 1987)).
"' See, e.g., Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27 STAN. L. REV. 567 (1975); Manning,
Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 767 (1977). For a contrary view suggesting
that hyperlexis is a myth, see Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and
Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31
UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983). For the best explanation of these apparently contrary findings, see
Hensler, Trends in Tort Litigation: Findings from the Institute for Civil Justice's Research, 48 OHIO
ST. L.J. 479, 492 (1987).
"Sue the Bastards" is a bumper sticker that is popular with more than just lawyers.
4 A survey of state court administrators found that 48 states have recently adopted or were
considering changes in civil procedure intended to reduce pretrial delay, P. EBENER, COURT EF-
FORTS TO REDUCE PRETRIAL DELAY (Rand Institute for Civil Justice 1981).
"' It takes forty months to get to trial in Los Angles, and three years in other parts of Califor-
nia. It takes three years to get to trial in the large urban areas of Pennsylvania. Snow & Abram-
son, supra note 12, at 44.
' Costs of Litigation, supra note 9, at 104.
" A few observers, however, argue the delay may be a benefit. PACE OF LITIGATION, supra
note 35, at x.
'I id. at vi.
48 Of course not all cases that are not tried are settled. One of the few studies to examine the
terminations of the vast number of cases that are not tried found that only 63 percent settled.
Thirty percent of the cases were terminated by means other than trial or settlement. Kritzer,
Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70 JUDICATURE 161, 163 (1986).
"' In a study of case dispositions, Professor Gerald Williams reported, "In Phoenix, for exam-
ple, we found that over 70% of all cases were settled within 30 days of the trial date." G.
WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 78, n.23 (1983).
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Since most cases are resolved in a negotiated agreement without a trial, it
appears that lawyers and dients could actively reduce the delay by settling their
cases earlier. It is undear why they do not settle earlier. Many cases go through
extensive pretrial discovery, which is expensive for the clients and income pro-
ducing for the hourly-fee lawyers. Determining damages is another probable
source of delay for both sides. Plaintiff lawyers may be waiting for their clients'
injuries to stabilize,5" while the defense may be expecting to see some rehabili-
tation that will reduce the damages. Some commentators contend that defend-
ants want to hold on to their money and invest it as long as possible."1 Perhaps
the adversary system creates so much animosity between the parties that neither
side is willing to extend a hand in compromise even if it might lead to a
settlement. Finally, lawyers might not give serious attention to a case until it
gets dose to the "doomsday" event of trial."
Despite the variety of attempts made to control delay, such as different types
of case calendaring, docket control methods, and settlement conferences, pretrial
delay remains as a serious and potentially crippling problem for court adminis-
trators and others concerned with optimizing justice in United States courts.
Although delay has been treated, but certainly not cured, costs have been gener-
ally untouched by procedural reforms.
D. Cost
Although discovery is an essential5" cornerstone of litigation, the costs of pre-
trial discovery are transforming our legal system into a system that is so costly
that someday only corporations 4 and wealthy individuals will be able to afford
to use it.55 In cases where lawyers work for- an hourly fee, the high cost of
"O Comment by speaker, Masters of the Game Seminar, Hawaii Institute for Continuing Legal
Education (Apr. 30, 1988).
"1 PACE OF LITIGATION, supra note 35, at vi; Pepe, Professional Responsibility in Pretrial Dis-
covery-A Tale of Two Cities, 64 MICH. BAR J. 300 (1985); Alschuler, supra note 7, at 1845
("[P]reserving the status quo favors the defendant in almost every lawsuit.").
5 E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN THREE FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURTS 79 (Federal Judicial Center 1983).
" As noted in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), "mutual knowledge of all the
relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation." id. at 507.
""The former chairman of one of America's largest corporations recently quipped that 'My
lawyers have an unlimited budget, and every year they exceed it.' " J. KAKALIK & A. ROBYN,
COSTS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM iii (Rand Institute for Civil Justice 1982).
" A popular cartoon that sums up the problem shows a lawyer asking a prospective client,
"Now, just how much justice can you afford?"
For a detailed examination of the problem see the articles in "Symposium: Reducing the Costs
of Civil Litigation", 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 217 (1985), especially Levin & Colliers, Containing the
Cost of Litigation, 37 RUTrGERS L. REv. 219 (1985); Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Costs of
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bringing suits may deter ordinary people from pressing their legitimate legal
claims.56
A growing criticism argues that civil cases are over-discovered. 67  A vast
amount of material has been written about discovery abuse and the assumed,
parallel rise in the litigation costs because of this discovery.58 In fact, the word
"abuse" appears in the titles of many publications about discovery.59 Criticism
Litigation: Case Management, Two-Stage Discovery Planning, and Alternative Dispute Resolution,
37 RUTrGERS L. REV. 253 (1985); Planet, supra note 3; Franaszek, Justice and the Reduction of
Litigation Cost: A Different Perspective 37 RUTGERS L. REv. 339 (1985).
The cost of discovery probably would not deter either side in litigating a tort lawsuit.
Because plaintiff lawyers take personal injury cases on a contingent fee, presumably injured plain-
tiffs will always be able to find a lawyer. Even poor plaintiffs can file lawsuits because their
discovery costs are advanced by plaintiff lawyers, who deduct the discovery costs from the plain-
tilfs recovery. These plaintiffs, however, might still not find a lawyer to represent them if the
lawyer thinks the case is uneconomical (damages are low, or liability is very questionable) or the
lawyer might not be able to advance large sums of money to conduct discovery. Defendants, of
course, will defend virtually all tort lawsuits because insurance companies are involved in most of
these suits. Insurance companies have the financial resources to litigate in all cases where it is
appropriate.
87 As observed by one commentator, "(slome over discovery results from compulsive, perfec-
tionist attorneys worried about professional criticism for lack of thoroughness, and fearing failure
at trial or settlement without near-perfect knowledge. The more common problem comes from
fixed law firm routines, aided by form books and word processors." Pepe, supra note 51, at 302.
"s Depositions are the costliest of discovery devices. Schmidt, The Efficient Use of Discovery,
FOR THE DEFENSE, Jun. 1984, at 25, 27.
11 C. ELLINGTON, A STUDY OF SANCTIONS FOR DISCOVERY ABUSE 17 (U.S. Dep't of Justice
1979); ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION, SPECIAL COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF DISCOVERY ABUSE,
FIRST REPORT (1977), reprinted in 92 F.R.D. 149 (1982); ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION, SECOND
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF DISCOVERY ABUSE (1980), reprinted in 92
F.R.D. 137 (1980); Becker, Modern Discovery: Promoting Efficient Use and Preventing Abuse of
Discovery in the Roscoe Pound Tradition, 78 F.R.D. 267, 274-75 (1978); Brazil, Views from the
Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers About the System of Civil Discovery, 1980 A.B.F. RES.
J. 217, 230-35; Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal Problems
and Abuses, 1980 A.B.F. RES. J. 789; Comment, Preventing Discovery Abuses in the Federal Courts,
30 CATH. UL. REV. 273, 284-305 (1981); District of Columbia Survey: Hinkle v. Sam Blanken &
Co.: Dismissal for Discovery Abuse - Toward a New Standard in the District of Columbia, 36
CATH. UL. REV. 761 (1987); Note, Discovery Abuse Under the Federal Rules: Causes and Cures,
92 YALE I.J. 352 (1982); Note, Rule 37 Sanctions: Deterrents to Discovery Abuses, 46 MONT. L.
REV. 95 (1985); Flegal, Discovery Abuse: Causes, Effects, and Reform, 3 REV. LITIGATION 1 (1982);
Lundquist & Flegal, Discovery Abuse - Some New Views About an Old Problem, 2 REV. LmGA-
TION 1 (1981); Note, The Emerging Deterrence Orientation in the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions,
91 HARv. L. REV. 1033 (1978); Flegal & Umin, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation:
We're Not There Yet, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 597 (1981); Pollack, Discovery - Its Abuse and
Correction, 80 F.R.D. 219 (1978); Rosenberg, Discovery Abuse, 7 LITIGATION at 8, 9-10 (Spr.
1981); Rosenberg & King, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough is Enough, 1981
B.Y.U. L REV. 579; Sherwood, Curbing Discovery Abuse: Sanctions Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the California Code of Civil Procedure, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 567 (1981);
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of discovery includes excessive use of discovery, sometimes in a "fishing expedi-
tion,"60 the unjustified resistance of legitimate discovery, 6' opportunities to de-
lay the resolution of valid legal claims," and attempts to intimidate the other
party with the cost of discovery. Although discovery procedures are, in theory,
designed to improve the exchange of information between the parties, discovery
is frequently put to a more adversarial use by delaying and making the pursuit
of a legal claim much more costly.6" At least for the hourly-fee lawyers, discov-
ery activity generally means an opportunity to bill more legal fees to the
client.64
Although discovery apparently is the prime villain in the criticisms about
delay and costs, it is only a part of the total cost of litigation. Lawyers' fees are
actually the larger,"' although lesser discussed, aspect of costs. 66 The combined
fees and expenses of plaintiff and defense lawyers in tort litigation range from
45 to 63 percent of the total amount expended in this litigation, including the
amount received by the injured plaintiffs.6" After deducting lawyers' fees, dis-
Sofaer, Sanctioning Attorneys for Discovery Abuse Under the New Federal Rules: On the Limited
Utility of Punishment, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 680 (1983); Note, Rule 37 Sanctions: Deterrents to
Discovery Abuses, 46 MONT. L. REv. 95 (1985); Levine, Abuse of Discovery: or Hard Work Makes
Good Law, 67 A.B.A. J. 565 (May 1981); Batista, New Discipline in Old Game-Sanctions for
Discovery Abuse, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 16, 1982, at 1, col. 2; Dombroff, Objective Procedures Could
Curb Discovery Abuse, Legal Times, Sept. 6, 1982, at 15, col. 1; Huffman, Protracted Litigation,
Abuses of Discovery Targeted by Judge, Legal Times, July 26, 1982, at 1, col. 1, at 32; Tell, Legal
Fee Axed for Litton Case Discovery Abuse, NAT'L .J., Oct. 12, 1981, at 2, col. 4.
60 A "fishing expedition . . . undertaken in the hope that some cause of action might be
uncovered." United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375, 1383 (D.C.
Cit. 1984).
61 Thames, Discovery Strategy, FOR mE DEFENSE, Jan. 1986, at 12-13. For a list of lawyering
skills of evasion and incomplete responses, see Pepe, supra note 51, at 301.
62 R. HAYDOCK, D. HERR & J. STEMPEL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRETRIuAL LITIGATION 121 (1985)
("Discovery for other lawyers seems to be the best way to avoid or delay going to trial, and that
attitude, too, accounts for its share of the abuse of discovery procedures.").
"8 See Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for Change,
31 VAND. L. REV. 1295 (1978); Shapiro, Some Problems of Discovery in an Adversary System, 63
MINN. L. REV. 1055 (1979).
64 One lawyer said, "Discovery is good for our business but has nothing to do with justice."
Brazil, Views from the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers About the System of Civil
Discovery, 1980 A.B.F. RES. J. 217, 250 n.53; Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effec-
tiveness, Its Principal Problems and Abuses, 1980 A.B.F. RES. J. 787.
65 ABA ACTION COMM. To REDUCE COURT COSTS AND DELAY, ATTACKING LITIGATION COSTS
AND DELAY 60 (1984) [hereinafter COSTS AND DELAY].
66 Lawyers' fees are part of litigation "transactions costs," which are "the sum of plaintiffs'
costs, defense costs, and public costs. They are the 'overhead' costs of the system in the sense that
the services purchased are not desired for themselves." S. CARROLL & N. PACE, ASSESSING THE
EFFECTS OF TORT REFORMS 22 (Rand Institute for Civil Justice 1987).
67 In auto torts, the defense legal fees are 19 percent, plaintiff legal fees are 26 percent, and
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covery costs, and other costs of litigation, plaintiffs receive only about 50 per-
cent 68 of the money paid out in trial verdicts or money paid to settle claims in
regular tort cases.69
Lawyers' fees are partially related to discovery, although the precise relation-
ship is dependant on how fees are calculated. Defense lawyers are almost al-
ways7 ° paid on an hourly basis. In most tort litigation, the defense lawyers are
paid by insurance companies. A large part of the hours defense lawyers bill for
tort litigation are hours spent conducting discovery. It is obvious that reducing
discovery will reduce the defense costs. Of course any program that reduces the
amount of discovery will have a corresponding effect on the income of the
hourly-fee defense lawyers, court reporters and paralegals. 1
Plaintiffs' lawyers, on the other hand, are paid on a contingent fee basis.
These lawyers receive no fee unless the plaintiff recovers. Typically, plaintiffs'
lawyers take a 33 to 40 percent contingent fee, although the rates vary de-
pending on the jurisdiction, the type of case, and the personal reputation of the
lawyer."' Because plaintiffs' lawyers are not paid on an hourly basis, reducing
discovery will not automatically reduce the lawyer's fee."3 In fact, studies of fee
the net compensation to the plaintiff is 52 percent. In non-auto torts, the defense legal fees are 30
percent, plaintiff legal fees are 24 percent, and the net compensation to the plaintiff is 43 percent.
In asbestos cases, the defense legal fees are 37 percent, plaintiff legal fees are 26 percent, and the
net compensation to the plaintiff is only 37 percent. D. HENSLER, M. VAIANA, J. KAKALiK & M.
PETERSON. TRENDS IN TORT LITIGATION 29 (Rand Institute for Civil Justice 1987).
68 Plaintiffs in automobile accident cases net about 52 percent of the total expenditures. In
non-auto torts they only receive about 37 percent of the transaction costs. Hensler, Trends in Tort
Litigation: Findings from the Institute for Civil Justice's Research, 48 OHIO ST. .J. 479, 492
(1987).
6 Costs are extremely high in asbestos cases. The average payout to plaintiffs in asbestos
litigation is only thirty-seven cents of every dollar paid by the insurance companies. J. KAKLIK,
COSTS OF ASBESTOS LITIGATION (Rand Institute for Civil Justice 1983).
70 In arbitration cases some lawyers are being paid to handle the case on a flat fee basis
through the arbitration hearing. If there is an appeal of the arbitration award, a new fee arrange-
ment is instituted in anticipation of trial de novo.
" Insurance companies are aware the discovery reductions which save expenses for the com-
pany will reduce defense fees. In Hawaii, these companies are trying to avoid problems with their
defense lawyers by promising that every time that a defense lawyer settles a case in arbitration,
another new case will be given to the defense lawyer to replace the one that has settled.
" In Hawaii, the fee is generally 33 i percent in automobile accident tort cases, and 40
percent for all other torts. At the time of recovery, the lawyer receives the agreed upon percentage
of the recovery. The costs of discovery are deducted from the plaintiff's share of the recovery, and
the plaintiffs lawyer is reimbursed for the advance of the discovery costs. Finally, the plaintiff
receives the net sum remaining. If there is a defense verdict at trial, the plaintiff still owes the
plaintiff lawyer for the costs of discovery, but in actuality the plaintiffs seldom pay back those
advanced discovery costs, and plaintiffs' lawyers seldom pursue their daim against the plaintiff for
the advanced discovery costs. Interview with a plaintiff's lawyer (April 20, 1988).
73 H. HENSLER, A. LIPSON & E. ROLPH, JUDICIAL ARBITRATION IN CALIFORNIA: THE FIRST YEAR
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structures have shown that programs saving the time of a plaintiff's lawyer did
not result in a fee reduction for the client.7 4 It is therefore possible that a reform
that reduces discovery will not reduce the income of plaintiffs' lawyers, but will
actually allow these lawyers to make the same amount of money in less time.
,The contingent fee system is a major subject of controversy," especially in
the age of "tort reform" and the concerns about medical malpractice litigation.
Those in favor of the contingent fee say that it is "the poor man's key to the
courthouse."76 Opponents, however, retort "that greedy attorneys, hungry for
fat contingency fees, generate suits that would not otherwise be brought." '' In
striking a balance between these two views, some jurisdictions have placed lim-
its on the amount of fees that a plaintiff's lawyer can receive, at least in medical
malpractice cases.7 8
82 (Rand Institute for Civil Justice 1981). Developments, Compulsory Automobile Arbitration:
New Jersey's Road to Reducing Court Congestion, Delay, and Costs, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 401, 430-
31 (1985).
"' In contingent fee cases, with procedures that save attorney time, "lawyers are benefiting, but
clients are not." COSTS AND DELAY, supra note 65, at 66. Chapper & Hanson, Attorney Time
Savings/Litigant Cost-Savings Hypothesis: Does Time Equal Money?, 8 JusT. Sys. J. 258 (1983).
" In concluding, we emphasize again our firm conviction that to the maximum degree
possible litigants themselves should be the beneficiaries of reductions in the cost of litiga-
tion. At the same time, we are acutely aware that overall costs to litigants are in the main
a reflection of how attorney's fees are structured in the United States and the various
methods of calculating such fees. Whether those fees are fair to counsel and client and
whether they can or should be changed substantially in amount or method of calculation
pose fundamental issues of fairness and political feasibility that our mission and our re-
sources could not encompass. We feel strongly, however, that the organized bar, at both
the national and state levels, has an inescapable and immediate duty to address this over-
riding issue of how attorneys' fees affect litigant cost and access to justice.
COSTS AND DELAY, supra note 65, at 67. See also, Clermont & Currivan, Improving on the Contin-
gent Fee, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 530 (1978); Kriendler, The Contingent Fee: Whose Interests are
Actually Being Served?, 14 FORUM 406 (1979).
7 Comment, Medical Malpractice in Florida: Prescription For Change, 10 FLA. ST. UL. REV.
593, 609 (1983) (citing the Florida Academy of Trial Lawyers, SELF-PRESERVATION OF A PRIVI-
LEGED CLASS 11 (1982)).
" Comment, Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation - A First Checkup, 50 TUL. L. REV. 655,
670 (1976).
78 COSTS AND DELAY, supra note 65. Klein, Caps in the Hat: Legislative Lids on Runaway
Verdicts, FOR THE DEFENSE, Jul. 1986, at 19, 22.
Section 6146 of California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA)
limits contingency fees in actions against a health care provider based upon alleged professional
negligence to: (1) 40% of the first $50,000 recovered; (2) 33;6% of the next $50,000; (3) 25%
of the next $100,000; and (4) 10% of any amount on which the plaintiffs recovery exceeds
$200,000.
See also DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 18, S 6865 (Supp. 1988) (medical malpractice); TENN. CODE
ANN. S 29-26-120 (Supp. 1988) (medical malpractice).
See Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, 37 Cal. 3d 920, 695 P.2d 164, 211 Cal. Rptr. 77, appeal
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III. HAWAII'S COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION PROGRAM
A. Program Goals
The intent of Hawaii's arbitration program "is to provide a simplified proce-
dure for obtaining a prompt and equitable resolution of certain civil matters.7 9
It is generally agreed that the major goals of the program are: (1) to reduce
litigant costs, (2) to increase the pace of disposing of tort cases, and (3) to
improve or at least maintain the level of satisfaction for litigants and attor-
neys.8 0 Although the arbitration program currently handles only tort cases,"' the
arbitration rules provide that parties may agree to submit other types of civil
cases to the program. 8 '
B. Program History
The Hawaii CAAP has operated in two different forms. When the program
first began in 1986, it was designed under the Hawaii Supreme Court's rule-
making power as a two-year experiment and was authorized in the Circuit
Court Rules for the First Circuit.88 Initially, the program was voluntary. Any
party could request that a tort case at or below a "probable jury award of
$50,000" be placed into the arbitration program. This first $50,000 program is
now referred to as Phase I.
Less than six months after the start of what was to have been a two-year
experiment, the Hawaii legislature changed the arbitration program. During a
special legislative session, it passed Act 2 of 1986,84 as part of "Tort Reform"
legislation.85 The most significant program change required by this new law was
a major increase in the jurisdictional ceiling for arbitration cases. Beginning on
May 1, 1987, the program was changed to require the arbitration of tort cases
dismi.rsed, 474 U.S. 990 (1985) (upholding the limit on contingent fees paid to plaintiff's
lawyer).
79 HAW. ARB. R. 2(A).
s" Letter from Janice Wolf, Administrative Director of the Courts and Peter S. Adler, Direc-
tor, Program on ADR, to the President and Members of the Senate, and the Speaker and Mem-
ber of the House of Representatives of the Thirteenth State Legislature of the State of Hawaii
(Dec. 30, 1986) (available in the office of The Study of Arbitration and Litigation, University of
Hawaii at Manoa).
8i HAW. ARB. R. 6(A).
8 Admission to the program also requires the consent of the Arbitration Judge. Id. R. 6(B).
To date, no non-tort cases have been accepted into the program.
83 HAW. CIR. CT. R. 34.
8 HAW. ARB. R. 6(A).
8' For a list of state tort reform laws passed in 1986, see S. CARROLL & N. PACE, ASSESSING
THE EFFECTS OF TORT REFORMS 47-72 (Rand Institute for Civil Justice 1987).
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with "a probable jury award value, not reduced by the issue of liability, exdu-
sive of interest and costs, of $150,000 or less." 86
C. Discovery Limitations
The design of the Hawaii program makes it clear that reducing litigant costs
is the prime goal of the program, and limiting discovery is the central mecha-
nism. Although most arbitration programs schedule arbitration hearings after
formal discovery has been completed, Hawaii's program does not allow any
discovery without the consent of the arbitrator. Arbitrators are given certain
guidelines for reducing or eliminating discovery.8" Informal, less costly methods
of discovery are encouraged.
D. Jurisdictional Amount
The Hawaii Court-Annexed Arbitration Program has, at $150,000, the
highest jurisdictional amount of any mandatory, full arbitration program in a
state court.88 Even in the Phase I ($50,000) program, Hawaii's jurisdictional
amount was as high as any state full-arbitration program in the country.8 9 In
the Phase II ($150,000) program, Hawaii's jurisdictional amount is three times
higher than any other state arbitration program.9 Only a few federal courts
86 HAW. AR. R. 6(A).
87 The training materials for arbitrators suggest that the following considerations be given to
any discovery request:
a. Balance the benefit of discovery requested against the expense and necessity.
b. Nature and complexity of the case.
c. The amount in controversy.
d. Possibility of unfair surprises which may result if discovery is restricted.
PACIFIC L. INST., HAWAII ARBITRATION SOURCEBOOK, 2-14 (1987).
" Michigan has a mandatory program which has no jurisdictional limit. This program, how-
ever, does not contemplate full arbitration hearings with testimony presented by witnesses. Each
case is allocated approximately 30 minutes before a panel of three mediators (a plaintiff lawyer,
and defense lawyer, and a neutral lawyer) who make an arbitration award. The award is more of
a case evaluation based upon the short presentation by the opposing lawyers and answers to
questions posed by the panel rather than an adjudicative result after hearing witnesses. Although
it is called the Michigan "Mediation" Program, the panel of lawyers perform the service of
arbitrators who propose a non-binding result and not the service of mediators who assist the
parties to reach their own decision. Interview with Robert W. Schweikart, Mediation Tribunal
Clerk, Mediation Tribunal Association for the Third Judicial Circuit Court of Michigan (Jan.
1987). See also Settling Cases in Detroit, supra note 26.
89 But see the Michigan Mediation program where mediators decide many cases per day.
Shuart, Smith & Planet, supra note 88.
90 California, Colorado, and Minnesota all have jurisdictional limits of $50,000. Keilitz, Gallas
& Hanson, State Adoption of Alternative Dispute Resolution, ST. CT. J., Spr. 1988, at 4.
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have jurisdictional amounts as high as Hawaii's.9"
E. Compensation for Arbitrators
Most arbitration programs compensate the arbitrators or at least provide an
honorarium.9 2 Hawaii, however, is asking its arbitrators to volunteer their time,
providing essentially "pro bono" service. 93 Arbitrators have averaged 6 hours of
work on cases that settled and 16 hours of work on cases in which an award
was rendered.
F. Changes from Phase I to Phase II
When the state legislature mandated that the Hawaii arbitration program
indude cases valued up to $150,000, the Judicial Arbitration Commission,9 '
which designed and oversaw the rules, reviewed the arbitration procedures and
revised some of these procedures in order to accommodate the new jurisdic-
tional amount. The Commission took this opportunity to make several other
program changes.
A significant change occurred in the gatekeeping function. In Phase I, all tort
cases valued at $50,000 or less were supposed to enter the program. These
cases, however, entered the program only if the plaintiff requested or the de-
fendant demanded arbitration. In essence, cases were invited into the program;
it was a voluntary program. As might be expected, many cases did not enter
the program for reasons of ignorance, caution, suspicion, or tactics.9 5 In Phase
II, the gatekeeping function was changed significantly. Now, all tort cases auto-
matically enter the program when they are filed in Circuit Court and attorneys
who do not think that their cases belong in the program must make a special
request to be exempted from the program.
To better control the flow of cases through the CAAP, Phase II rules require
arbitrators to schedule a pre-hearing conference within thirty days of the date a
case is assigned.9" In addition, the arbitration selection process was changed.
9' See P. EBENER & D. BETANCOURT, supra note 4 (The jurisdictional limit for the Middle
District of North Carolina is $150,000.); see also SURVEY OVERVIEW, supra note 15.
92 p. EBENER & D. BETANCOURT, supra note 4, at 8-10.
9' There has been an on-going discussion whether CAAP should at least pay the arbitrators an
honorarium. Any payment to arbitrators will, of course, increase the cost of the program.
9" The Commission is a body of representatives of plaintiff and defense lawyers as well as one
representative from the insurance industry. It has the responsibility to "develop, monitor, main-
tain, supervise and evaluate the program." HAW. ARB. R. 4(A).
9' The noted rationales were gleaned from interviews with lawyers, available on file in the
office of The Study of Arbitration and Litigation, University of Hawaii at Manoa.
96 HAW. ARB. R. 15(D).
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Under Phase I rules, one arbitrator was initially assigned to a case, and if either
party objected to the arbitrator, a list of five potential arbitrators was proposed
to the parties. Each party was allowed to strike two names. The arbitrator who
remained after both parties struck two potential arbitrators, or one of the re-
maining arbitrators if only one party struck names, was appointed."7 Under
Phase II rules, five potential arbitrators are initially proposed."
During the summer of 1987, CAAP was expanded to all circuit courts in the
state."" Expansion to the neighbor islands offers new challenges to the program,
most notably, ensuring a sufficient supply of arbitrators on each of the neighbor
islands.10
G. Hawaii's Program Description
The Hawaii CAAP is a mandatory, non-binding arbitration procedure for
tort cases with a probable jury award of less than $150,000. For purposes of
this program, all tort cases are presumed to be valued at $150,000 or less." 0' In
other words, all tort cases are initially assigned to the arbitration program, and
then attorneys are required to submit a request to have their case exempted
from the program if they believe the value of the case exceeds $150,000.10'
After the last defendant's answer is filed, a volunteer arbitrator'0 3 is assigned
to the case. The arbitrator must schedule a pre-hearing conference within thirty
days from the date the case is assigned, °"' and must determine what pretrial
discovery the arbitrator will permit. Discovery is permitted only with the con-
sent of the arbitrator.'0 5 The arbitrator can assist in settling the case if all par-
97 HAW. ARB. R. 9 (repealed 1987).
98 HAW. ARB. R. 9.
" id. 27.
100 Twenty-three percent of Hawaii's population lives on the neighbor islands, but only six
percent of the state's lawyers live on the neighbor islands. HAW. BAR NEws, July 1988, at 20.
Observers agree that most potential arbitrators on the neighbor islands are plaintiff's attorneys.
The neighbor island arbitrator pool has raised issues regarding the balance of the pool.
10 Under the Phase II program, all cases are presumed into the program. HAW. ARB. R. 8(A).
Under the earlier Phase I program, either the plaintiff or the defendant could request arbitration
for cases valued at $50,000 or less. HAW. ARB. R. 8 (repealed 1987).
102 HAW. ARB. R. 8(A). The Arbitration Administrator automatically exempts wrongful death
cases.
103 Currently all arbitrators are lawyers. The attorneys "shall have substantial experience in
civil litigation, and shall have been licensed to practice law in the State of Hawaii for a period of
five (5) years, or can provide the Judicial Arbitration Commission with proof of equivalent quali-
fying experience." Id. 10(B).
1'4 Id. 15(D).
'08 HAW. ARB. R. 14(A) ("Once a case is submitted to the Program, the extent to which
discovery is allowed, if at all, is at the sole discretion of the arbitrator.").
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ties consent in writing. 1 If the case proceeds to an arbitration hearing, the
attorneys must file a pre-hearing statement"'7 within thirty days prior to the
date of the hearing.' 0 8
At the arbitration hearing, the rules of evidence are relaxed 0 9 and no tran-
scription or recording is permitted. 1 0 Although findings of fact and conclusions
of law are not required, arbitration awards must be in writing.1 1' Awards are
not limited to the jurisdictional amount of $150,000.1' Awards must be filed
within seven days of the conclusion of the arbitration hearing or within thirty
days after the receipt of the final authorized memoranda of counsel."a The
award becomes the final judgment if neither party files a written Notice of
Appeal and Request for Trial De Novo within twenty days after the award is
served upon the parties. " ' If such Notice and Request is timely filed, the case
is scheduled for trial de novo. The case is then treated as if arbitration did not
occur and full discovery is permitted under the rules of civil procedure. No
testimony made during the course of the arbitration hearing is admissible in the
trial de novo."'
There are disincentives attached to the appeal process in the form of sanc-
tions for failure to prevail in the trial de novo. When parties appeal, they must
receive an award that is at least fifteen percent greater at the trial de novo than
they received at the arbitration award. 1 6 If the party fails, the party is subject
to sanctions of attorney fees up to $5000, costs of jurors, and other reasonable
costs actually incurred since the appeal of the arbitration award. 1 7
H. Program Evaluation-Research Project Design
Researchers from the University of Hawaii have been studying and evaluat-
ing the arbitration program through a project called The Study of Arbitration
and Litigation (SAL)." 8 The evaluation is conducted in a randomized 1 1' exper-
106 Id. II(A)(10).
1 7 The arbitration rules dictate the contents of the pre-hearing statement, which includes
material similar to what would be included in a pre-trial settlement conference with a judge. Id.
16.
108 Id.
10" Id. 11(A)(2).
110 Id. 17.
' Id. 19.
11s Id. 19(B).
11 Id. 20(A).
114 id. 21.
115 Id. 23(C).
116 Id. 25.
117 Id. 26.
.. The Study of Arbitration and Litigation (SAL) is located at Department of Sociology,
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imental design with two groups of cases; one-half of the cases are assigned to
the arbitration program and the remaining one-half of the cases are designated
as a "comparison group" and are assigned to regular litigation.1 " Initially, all
tort cases are presumed eligible for arbitration and are assigned to the arbitra-
tion program when they are filed in the derk's office. Eligible cases are then
assigned either to arbitration or to regular litigation by random numbers.
A comparison group of cases is necessary to measure the effects of arbitration
against cases in regular litigation. A comparison group is also necessary to de-
velop an adequate database on cases in regular litigation. Current court records
are only partially useful in this regard because they are geared to tracking cases,
but not to evaluating alternatives.
The focus of the evaluation is on: (1) cost, (2) pace, and (3) satisfaction,
which are factors reflecting the goals of CAAP. "Cost" includes discovery costs,
time spent on cases by plaintiffs' lawyers, and hourly fees of defense lawyers.
"Pace" measures the time necessary to resolve a case once it enters the arbitra-
tion program. "Satisfaction" is measured by questions asking lawyers how satis-
fied they and their clients were with the program. The essence of the program
evaluation is to determine whether disposing of a case in the arbitration pro-
gram can decrease cost and increase pace, while maintaining satisfaction.
Aside from whether or not the case was in CAAP, several major factors are
expected to influence cost, pace, and satisfaction. Maximum exposure, case com-
plexity, experience of and confidence in the arbitrator, and whether the case
progressed to an award or was settled, may be significant factors. On an even
more basic level, lawyers may have different views of arbitration because arbi-
tration impacts plaintiff and defense lawyers differently, especially in the area of
lawyers' fees. Because the arbitration program seeks to reduce discovery, the
effect of arbitration on contingent-fee plaintiffs' lawyers, who do not get paid
for the time they expend on discovery may be different from the effect on the
Porteus Hall 237, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Honolulu, Hawaii, 96822. This project is
currently funded by a three-year contract from the Hawaii Judiciary and in-kind contributions
from the Program for Conflict Resolution, The. Sociology Department, and the William S. Rich-
ardson School of Law, all of the University of Hawaii at Manoa.
The randomized experiment has been referred to as "the most powerful of research de-
signs." Lind & Foster, supra note 16, at 128. For more about random samples, see D. Vinson &
P. Anthony, Social Science Research Methods for Litigation 142-44 (1985).
" This proportion of regular litigation cases to arbitration cases has changed because of pro-
gram needs. Formerly, one-third of the cases were randomly assigned to the comparison group.
Originally one-third was decided upon as the random comparison sample by the Arbitration
Commission, the Arbitration Administrator, and the evaluation team. It was later increased to
one-half at the behest of CAAP to decrease the number of arbitrators needed. Some plaintiff
lawyers whose cases fell randomly in the comparison sample have complained that they want their
comparison case placed into the arbitration program. These comments suggest that the arbitration
program is satisfactory to plaintiff's lawyers.
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hourly-fee defense lawyers who derive the major portion of their fees from con-
ducting discovery. Perhaps other factors that have not yet been isolated will also
have a substantial effect.
Data collected for the evaluation are kept in the strictest confidence. Only
aggregated information is released. Evaluation data is collected from: (1) court
and arbitration records, (2) surveys sent to lawyers and arbitrators for cases both
in arbitration and regular litigation, and (3) inquiries to insurance companies,
discussions with judiciary employees, and interviews with lawyers.
The evaluation was begun by using a survey questionnaire for lawyers and
arbitrators and the case record files maintained by the court and the arbitration
program. During the late fall of 1986 and the early spring of 1987, telephone
interviews were conducted with forty-six lawyers who argued cases in CAAP
during the first six months of Phase I. These interviews helped to shape the
questions that were asked in later parts of the evaluation. The interviews indi-
cated that a large majority of lawyers viewed the program as helpful. A smaller
group had their cases terminated with minimal or no involvement of the arbi-
trators. A still smaller group was dissatisfied with the program. This pattern of
opinions appears consistent with the recent survey of Phase I cases.
I. The Survey of Closed Cases From Phase I
It must be strongly emphasized that this is only a report on the findings of
the first surveys of arbitration cases in Phase I of the program ($50,000 ceil-
ing).1" 1 Phase II ($150,000 ceiling) began in May 1987 and too few cases have
been terminated and surveyed yet to provide meaningful and accurate data on
Phase II. The data on Phase II may be similar to or different from the data
reported here.1"" This report also does not report information from the random-
ized comparison sample, which has not yet been fully collected.
When cases terminated from CAAP, surveys were sent to the arbitrator and
the lawyers of all award cases and one out of four cases reaching settlement. A
total of 334 surveys were sent to lawyers and arbitrators involved in 118 cases
in Phase I. Of these, 268 surveys were returned, representing 80% of plaintiffs'
lawyers surveyed, 74% of defense lawyers and 88% of arbitrators. Occasionally,
121 Phase I cases are those filed between February 15, 1986, and April 30, 1987.
... Note, however, that because Phase I cases (under $50,000) are a subset of the Phase II
cases (under $150,000) and because the lawyers who handle Phase I cases are also the same
lawyers who handle Phase II cases, it is expected that there will be some correspondence between
the Phase I and the Phase II evaluations. When the program was being designed, unofficial
Hawaii statistics indicated that 85 percent of all tort cases settled at values of $150,000 or below
and that 60 percent of all tort cases settled at values of $50,000 or below. The other major
difference between Phase I and Phase II is that Phase I was a voluntary program and Phase II is a
mandatory program.
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however, only one party involved in the arbitration returned the survey. Conse-
quently, plaintiff views are lacking for some cases and defense views for other
cases. Initially, data analysis was conducted upon only 49 cases where usable
surveys were returned from both plaintiff and defense, and where there was only
one plaintiffs and one defense lawyer involved. Interestingly, when data from
all the cases were compared to the data from cases where both plaintiff and
defense responded, no significant differences were found. Therefore, the data
presented in this article comes from the larger set of all 268 responses.
J. Discovery and Cost Reduction
A major goal for the Hawaii arbitration program is to reduce expenses for
litigants by reducing discovery. Survey results indicate that discovery was re-
duced, and it was reduced without affecting the outcome of the case for the
most part. (See Table 1.) In cases that settled, 74% of arbitrators, 85% of
plaintiffs' lawyers and 76% of defense lawyers thought discovery was reduced.
In cases resulting in awards, 95% of arbitrators, 86% of plaintiffs' lawyers and
78% of defense lawyers thought discovery was reduced. It is important to note
that 78% of plaintiffs' lawyers and 72% of defense lawyers whose cases went to
an award reported that discovery reduction did not affect the outcome of the
case, while 22% were sure that it had and 28% were uncertain.
Discovery can be reduced either because lawyers voluntarily agree to limit
discovery or because the arbitrator denies requests for discovery. Since arbitra-
tors reported that they denied discovery requests in only 10% of cases reaching
settlement and 30% in cases reaching award, the statistics suggest that discovery
is being reduced primarily through voluntary discovery reductions by the law-
yers. On the issue of discovery denials, defense lawyers perceived more denials
of discovery requests than did plaintiffs' lawyers. Nearly 39% of defense law-
yers, but only 20% of plaintiffs' lawyers, whose cases went to an award thought
discovery requests had been denied. In addition, 28% of defense lawyers, but
only 17% of plaintiffs' lawyers, whose cases were settled thought discovery re-
quests had been denied.
Discovery costs also were examined in the evaluation. (See Table 2.) Plain-
tiffs' lawyers reported lower discovery costs than defense lawyers. Plaintiffs' law-
yers reported discovery was less than $400 in 57% of settlements and 27% of
awards. Defense lawyers reported discovery was less than $400 in 42% of settle-
ments and 34% of awards. Discovery costs were between $400 and $1000 for
plaintiffs in 34% of settlements and 38% of awards, and above $1000 in 9% of
settlements and 35% of awards. Discovery costs were between $400 and $1000
for defense lawyers in 32% of both settlements and awards, and above $1000
in 26% of settlements and 34% of awards. The average discovery costs for the
plaintiffs were $445 for settlements and $761 for awards. For defense lawyers,
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the discovery costs were $750 for settlements and $962 for awards. Until the
comparison group data is available, the savings in discovery costs attributable to
the program cannot be estimated.
Discovery costs for regular litigation cannot be accurately estimated until the
evaluation of comparison cases is completed. In the survey however plaintiffs'
lawyers more often saw CAAP as saving cost than did defense lawyers. Plain-
tiffs' lawyers, 80% who settled and 86% who proceeded to the award stage
reported that the case would have cost more if it had not been in CAAP. For
defense lawyers, 58% who settled and 52% who went to award reported that
the case would have cost more if it had not been in CAAP.
K. Pace of Disposition
The majority of lawyers agreed that if their case had not been in CAAP it
would have taken longer to terminate. (See Table 3.) Again, however, the views
of the plaintiffs' and defense lawyers differed. Of cases that settled, 87% of
plaintiffs' lawyers and 71% of defense attorneys thought the case would have
taken longer if it was not in the arbitration program. In award cases, 88% of
plaintiffs' lawyers and 63% of defense attorneys thought the case would have
taken longer if it was not in the arbitration program.
L. Lawyer Satisfaction
Overall, lawyers were satisfied with the way their cases were handled in the
program, but lawyers who reported a voluntary settlement were more often sat-
isfied than were the lawyers whose cases continued to the award stage. (See
Table 4.) Furthermore, there was more criticism and dissatisfaction from de-
fense lawyers than from plaintiff lawyers. Satisfaction differed depending on
whether the case settled or went to award. The survey revealed that 98% of
plaintiffs' lawyers and 86% of defense lawyers whose cases settled were satisfied;
75% of plaintiffs' lawyers and 49% of defense lawyers whose cases went to an
award were satisfied.
There is a high correlation between lawyer satisfaction and the lawyer's per-
ception of whether the award was similar to what the lawyer thought the ver-
dict would have been at trial. Remember, however, that the assumption that
the case would have gone to trial is quite hypothetical. Trials are infrequent.
Less than three percent of tort cases are tried in Hawaii," 3 which is even lower
than the national average for trials. 12 4
123 THE JUDICIARY. STATE OF HAWAII, 1986-1987 ANNUAL REPORT, STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT
(1987). Annual reports for prior years also show a low trial rate.
1"4 See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
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When cases did proceed to the award stage, more plaintiffs' lawyers (64%)
than defense lawyers (47%) thought the awards were similar to the expected
trial verdict. More defense than plaintiffs' lawyers believed that awards were
worse than they would have expected at trial. Seventy-eight percent of plaintiffs'
lawyers who saw the awards as similar to verdicts were satisfied with the arbi-
tration program. Sixty-two percent of defense lawyers who saw the awards as
similar to verdicts were satisfied with the arbitration program.
Not unexpectedly, lawyers who saw the arbitration award as different from
the trial verdict were much less satisfied on both sides of the case. Only 50% of
the plaintiffs' lawyers who saw the awards as different from trial were satisfied,
and only 13% of the defense lawyers who saw the awards as different from trial
were satisfied.
Both plaintiffs' and defense lawyers indicated that they were satisfied with
the arbitration program, although they were more satisfied with cases that set-
tled in the program than with cases that went to arbitration awards. 5 ' Of cases
that settled, 98% of plaintiffs' lawyers and 86% of defense lawyers reported that
they were satisfied. In award cases, 74% of plaintiffs' lawyers and 49% of de-
fense lawyers reported that they were satisfied.
M. Terminations and Arbitrator Involvement
In Phase I, 278 cases entered the program between February 15, 1986 and
April 31, 1987. As of June 30, 1988, 270 cases had terminated:"' 183 were
settled, 65 went to awards, 16 were dismissed, 6 were dassified as "other," and
8 were pending."' Of the cases that were terminated, settlements accounted for
68% and awards accounted for 24% of the cases.1 1 8 The ratio of settlements to
STATES COURTS (1987); THE BUSINESS OF STATE TRIAL COURTS 43 (National Center for State
Courts 1983).
... Although in this phase of the evaluation clients were not surveyed to determine their
satisfaction with the arbitration program, the lawyers were asked to give estimates of their clients'
satisfaction. Both plaintiff and defense lawyers thought that their clients were satisfied with the
arbitration program. Interestingly, defense lawyers estimated that their clients were more satisfied
than they, the lawyers, were, and plaintiffs' lawyers estimated that their clients were equally or
less satisfied than they, their lawyers, were. Of cases that settled, both 92% of plaintiffs' lawyers
and 92% of defense lawyers estimated that their clients were satisfied. In award cases, 74% of
plaintiffs' lawyers and 57% of defense lawyers estimated that their clients were satisfied.
1* Termination statistics have been provided by Ed Aoki, Arbitration Administrator.
117 Phase II will have a larger number of cases both because of the higher ceiling and largely
because the program is mandatory in Phase II. As of June 30, 1988, 974 cases have entered the
Phase II program and 447 have terminated. Of the cases that entered Phase II, 211 were settled,
66 went to awards, 96 were dismissed, 53 were exempted, 17 were classified as "other," and 531
are pending in this on-going program.
118 In Phase II, settlements have accounted for 55% and awards have accounted for 16% of
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awards was approximately three to one (183 to 65).
Some cases settled before the arbitrator was appointed, others settled after the
appointment of the arbitrator, but before the arbitrator did any work on the
case. Some cases settled with the arbitrator's assistance. Other cases, of course,
went to an award. Survey results indicated that arbitrators were actively in-
volved in approximately half the cases. Twenty-eight percent of the cases settled
with the arbitrator's assistance.1" 9 Twenty-four percent of the cases studied re-
ceived an arbitrator's award. Of the remaining cases, there was either no arbi-
trator appointed or very little arbitrator activity. The mean number of hours
that arbitrators spent on cases was 5.1 hours on settled cases and 15.4 hours on
award cases.13 0
N. Appeals to a Trial De Novo
After an arbitration award, a case can be appealed to a trial de novo. So far,
65 awards have been issued, 26 appeals have been filed, and 16 cases have
settled before the trial de novo. All other appeals were still pending. At a later
date, the evaluation project will collect data on these appeal cases. In Phase I
40% of the awards have been appealed.13 1 Arbitration programs across the
country find that a much higher percentage of cases appeal than ultimately go
to the trial de novo. 32 In other arbitration programs, most appeals settle before
trial. 133
the terminations. As in Phase I, Phase II has experienced a ratio of three settlements (394) to
each award (131).
129 The arbitrator has the authority "to attempt, with the consent of all parties in writing, to
aid in the settlement of the case." HAW. ARB. R. I I(A)(10). However, cases may settle while the
arbitrator is working on the case, but without the direct assistance of the arbitrator. In one case
reported to the Arbitration Administrator, the lawyers settled the case while waiting in the lobby
of the arbitrator just before the first meeting with the arbitrator. This example shows the impor-
tance of using court-annexed arbitration to bring the opposing lawyers together to talk about the
case earlier than they would normally meet in regular litigation.
ao Early returns on Phase II surveys show that mean hours for arbitrators are down slightly in
Phase II. The mean number of hours that arbitrators spent on cases was 3.5 hours on settled cases
and 13.8 hours on award cases.
11 In Phase II, 51%, or 38 of the 75 awards have been appealed.
... For example, one study of three federal district courts found that appeals were filed in 60%
of cases that went to awards. However, the actual number of trials held was less than the num-
bers of trials before the arbitration programs began. Lind & Foster, supra note 16, at 128.
"Ia D. HENSLER, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN THE STATE TRIAL COURTS SYSTEM 8 (Rand
Institute for Civil Justice 1984).
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0. Arbitrator Quality and Supply
The issues of arbitrator quality and supply are very important to the pro-
gram. The viability of the arbitration program depends upon the ability of
volunteer arbitrators, drawn from the ranks of partisan practicing lawyers, to
credibly assume the role of high-quality, neutral experts. Two items in the case
dosing survey are germane to these concerns about perceived arbitrator quality.
The vast majority (90%) of both plaintiffs' and defense lawyers agree that arbi-
trators have the requisite experience to decide the cases before them fairly, and
nearly as many, 89% of plaintiffs' and 80% of defense lawyers, believe that the
arbitrator was neutral and impartial.
Of course, the arbitration program must have a sufficient supply of qualified
arbitrators to meet the case demands. Because the program assigns an arbitrator
to a case at a very early stage, each case needs an arbitrator. Initially, 241
arbitrators were in the arbitrator pool for the Phase I program."3 4 The size of
the arbitrator pool has been increased to 416 in the Phase II program, but
arbitrator supply remains a critical issue for the program. If the Hawaii pro-
gram was not placing half of the arbitration-eligible cases into a "control
group" and re-assigning them back to the regular litigation track, CAAP would
not be able to assign arbitrators to every case in the program.
P. Complex Litigation
Although many people have suggested that arbitration may be inappropriate
for complex cases,' 3 5 most lawyers reported that these Phase I cases were not
complex. In 1986, the research team conducted a telephone survey of lawyers
with cases in or eligible for the $50,000 Phase I program. One focus of that
survey was to determine what types of cases might be inappropriate for CAAP.
Several lawyers questioned the appropriateness of arbitration for complex cases.
Very few of the lawyers in this recent survey thought that their cases were
complex. Only 12% of plaintiff lawyers and 4% of defense lawyers reported that
their cases were complex.
1 Arbitrators volunteered for the program by agreeing to serve after receiving a letter from
the Chief Justice of the Hawaii Supreme Court.
Results of telephone interviews with lawyers, November-December 1986 (on file in the
office of The Study of Arbitration and Litigation, University of Hawaii at Manoa). The arbitrators
must have substantial experience in civil litigation and have been licensed to practice in the state
for five years. HAW. ARB. R. 10.
University of Hawaii Law Review / Vol. 11:81
Q. Amounts of Settlements and Awards
The 24 surveyed cases that settled averaged $20,803.63. Arbitration awards
were somewhat higher. If the zero awards are excluded from the survey results,
the mean value of awards was $28,662.92. If the 3 zero awards are induded,
the average was $25,223.37.
Plaintiffs' lawyers reported that settlements averaged $21,899 and that
awards averaged $27,875. Defense lawyers reported slightly lower averages,
$20,060 for settlements and $25,105 for awards (excluding zero awards).
The survey also asked lawyers to report what they initially thought their case
was worth. Defense lawyers, on the average, valued the amount at issue lower
than the plaintiffs' lawyers did. Plaintiffs' lawyers' estimates of the worth for
cases that went to settlement averaged $29,407 and for awards $30,488. For
defense, estimates of the worth for cases that settled averaged $19,408 and
awards averaged $12,795.
R. Insurance Companies
Because insurance companies initially provided part of $200,000 in private
funding to begin Phase I of CAAP, it can be assumed that these companies
thought the program would save defense costs. So far, however, there has been
no direct critique from insurance companies concerning the arbitration program.
If the program does in fact save defense costs, an interesting economic factor
may arise on the defense side. Reduced discovery should be viewed as a positive
factor by the insurance companies because their costs will decrease. Reduced
discovery, however, will mean that the defense lawyers will then find that their
incomes have decreased. The ramifications of this dash of interests on the de-
fense side are open to speculation.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The initial findings of the evaluation of Hawaii's Court-Annexed Arbitration
Program indicate that the program is meeting its goals. Costs to litigants have
decreased, the pace of disposition has increased, and the satisfaction of the law-
yers has been maintained. Most importantly from a national perspective is the
indication that in a carefully controlled arbitration program, discovery (and cor-
respondingly costs to litigants) can be reduced without impairing the fairness of
the dispute resolution process. Court-Annexed Arbitration, particularly in the
Hawaii form, appears to offer great promise in reducing the long standing
problems of delay and costs in the United States' legal system.
Participating lawyers differ somewhat in their view of CAAP. Lawyers were
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satisfied with the program, although more plaintiffs' lawyers were satisfied than
were defense lawyers. As might be expected, more lawyers were satisfied with
their voluntary settlements than with the awards rendered by the arbitrators.
Most plaintiffs' lawyers, defense lawyers and arbitrators reported that the pro-
gram reduced discovery and that discovery reduction did not affect case out-
come. Most plaintiffs' lawyers believed that if their case had not been in CAAP
it would have cost more to terminate the case. Only about half of the defense
lawyers believed that the arbitration program was less costly than ordinary liti-
gation. Similarly, most plaintiffs' lawyers believed that if their case had not
been in the arbitration program it would have taken longer to terminate the
case. Only about half of the defense lawyers believed that the arbitration pro-
gram was faster than ordinary litigation. Later evaluation efforts will explore the
reasons for the consistent differences in views of plaintiffs' and defense lawyers.
It is possible, however, that CAAP has in some way changed the practice of
law, especially for defense lawyers, and this change, rather than economic fac-
tors, accounts for the less favorable opinion about CAAP by defense lawyers.
TABLE 1
DISCOVERY REDUCTION
(SHOWN IN PERCENTAGES)
PLAINTIFF DEFENSE
SETTLEMENT AWARD SETTLEMENT AWARD
DISCOVERY REDUCED 85 86 76 78
NOT REDUCED 15 14 24 22
n-40 , n=43 n=37 n=51
DISCOVERY REDUCTION
AFFECTED OUTCOME
NO 86 78 71 72
YES OR MAYBE 14 22 29 28
n=3 6  n=41 n=32 n=49
ARBITRATOR DENIED
DISCOVERY REQUEST
NO 83 80 72 61
YES 17 20 28 .39
n=35 n=41 n=29 n=46
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TABLE 2
COSTS
COSTS IF NOT IN
ARBITRATION
LESS - 2 5 11
SAME 20 12 37 37
GREATER 80 86 58 52
n=40 n=42 n=38 n=4 6
DISCOVERY COST
:51$400 57 27 42 34
401-999 34 38 32 32
1000 and over 9 35 26 34
Average Cost $445 $761 $750 $962
n=35 n=37 n=31 n=35
TABLE 3
PACE: ARBITRATION COMPARED TO LITIGATION
IF CASE WAS NOT IN CAAP,
IT WOULD HAVE CLOSED
SOONER - 5 - 13
IN SAME TIME 13 7 29 24
LATER 87 88 71 61
n=39 n=42 n=38 n=46
TABLE 4
LAWYER SATISFACTION
SATISFACTION
LAWYER
SATISFIED 98 75 86 49
DISSATISFIED OR
AMBIVALENT 2 25 14 51
n=39 n=43 n=36 n=49
AWARD COMPARED WITH
ESTIMATED TRIAL VERDICT
SIMILAR 64 47
DIFFERENT 36 53
n=42 n=45
AWARD COMPARED WITH
EXPECTATION FOR AWARD
BETTER 14
SAME 43 43
WORSE 43 57
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TABLE 5
RATINGS OF ARBITRATORS
PLAINTIFF DEFENSE
SETTLE AWARD SETTLE AWARD
ARBITRATOR
EXPERIENCE
NOT ENOUGH 19 3 15
YES, ENOUGH 100 81 97 85
n=32 n=36 n=33 n=46
ARBITRATOR
FAIRNESS
IMPARTIAL 91 88 82 79
PARTIAL BUT
NO EFFECT 9 2 12 6
PARTIAL AND
EFFECT - 10 6 15
n=32 n=40 n=33 n=48
TABLE 6
AVERAGE SETTLEMENT AND AWARD AMOUNTS
PLAINTIFF DEFENSE
SETTLE AWARD SETTLE AWARD
MEAN AMOUNTS, $21,899 $27,875 $20,060 $25,105
EXCLUDING ZERO
AMOUNTS
n=41 n=37 n=38 n=40
MEAN AMOUNTS,
INCLUDING ZERO
AWARDS $23,985 $19,690
n=
43 n=51
ESTIMATES OF
WORTH $29,407 $30,488 $19,408 $12,795
n=38 n=43 n=30 n=44

